Published / Updated- January 31, 2025 21:32 IST
By:- URVASHI SARKAR
Advocates of nuclear power argue that it is a “clean”, quick, and cost-efficient energy. M.V. Ramana’s latest book disagrees.Thirteen years after his path-breaking book The Power of Promise: Examining Nuclear Energy in India comes Professor M.V. Ramana’s most recent offering, candidly titled Nuclear is Not the Solution: The Folly of Atomic Power in the Age of Climate Change.
While the earlier book explored the ambitious claims of India’s energy programme, the current book is centred on the larger question of the climate change crisis and why atomic power is not the answer. Through examples, largely from North America and the UK, this work also takes stock of newer developments such as cryptocurrency and small modular reactors (SMRs), touted as a panacea to all the ills that bog down the current breed of nuclear reactors.
Advocates of nuclear power argue that it is a “clean” energy which can meet the power requirements of domestic consumers and industry rapidly and in a cost-efficient way. Even as they pitch nuclear energy as a magic bullet for everything that requires electricity, including water shortages in Africa, Ramana’s book shows how this is far from the reality on the ground.
The first part of the book delves into the ludicrous cost and time overruns of nuclear reactors in the US. For example, the cost of a $9 billion nuclear project in South Carolina which eventually did not start operations was borne by taxpayers and electricity ratepayers. Ramana shows the historical underperformance of nuclear energy, including power projection targets that were widely off the mark, chronic cost and time overruns as well as overriding safety issues.
A key argument is that nuclear energy simply cannot expand quickly enough to meaningfully help lower carbon dioxide emissions. Ramana writes: “It takes fifteen to twenty years to plan for and build each nuclear plant, and even longer for unproven theoretical reactor designs, such as small modular reactors or high-temperature gas-cooled reactors.” Renewable sources of energy like solar and wind power can be scaled up much more rapidly.
At its core, Nuclear is Not the Solution is also an argument against the purported cost effectiveness of nuclear energy. If anything, the financial woes of the US-based Westinghouse and French utility supplier EDF are proof enough that the maths simply does not add up.
Why then does the nuclear industry continue to flourish, with governments and corporations backing them with zest?
Ramana shows the reader how the building of nuclear reactors is a big lucrative business, with companies making money in advance even before the reactor begins to produce a single unit of electricity. In the case of the South Carolina plant, executives made billions from the government and from taxpayers merely by initiating work on the nuclear project and charging them under heads like evaluation, design, engineering, consulting, environmental and geotechnical analysis. Nuclear energy think tanks lobbied the US Congress for tax credits simply for investing in building nuclear power plants rather than waiting for tax credits after the production of electricity from the nuclear reactor. The book points out in no uncertain terms that there is money to be made before, during, and even after the ceasing of operations of nuclear power plants.
After the reactor stops generating electricity and revenue, the plant needs to be “decommissioned”. The costs of decommissioning, running into millions, involve removing fuel from the reactor, deconstructing, and dismantling the entire project with buildings, as well as waste management and disposal.
The most significant part of the book is where Ramana lays bare the nuclear industry’s alliances with other industries. These alliances profit from each other and thrive on each other’s growth. One of the most significant alliances is between the nuclear industry and the fossil fuel industry. Ramana points out: “All major nuclear-power plant-owning utilities in the United States also own coal plants or natural gas plants or oil-fired plants. ”The alliance finds its strength from “financial overlaps between corporations that invest in and profit from both these sectors”. In some cases, the same corporation profits from fossil fuels and nuclear power, for example, Bechtel. Alliances have mushroomed between bitcoin and nuclear industries, both contributing to each other’s greenwashing.
Nuclear is Not the Solution also serves as an important reminder to readers of the irrefutable links between civilian nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. Ramana identifies the main elements that unite the two and illustrates it extensively. The revolving door of employees that flourishes at the intersection of the civilian sector and military nuclear establishment is made obvious. These links need to be reiterated since governments and corporations prefer not to draw attention to the relationship between the use of nuclear energy for civilian and military purposes.
The book weaves together multidisciplinary references from history and sociology even as it steers away from jargon in order to reach wider audiences. Rather than fear-mongering, Ramana substantiates his arguments with data and by using the examples of the Chernobyl and Fukushima disasters, which even technologically advanced and highly organised countries like the USSR and Japan struggled to cope with.
Meanwhile, India continues to project nuclear power as a clean and viable alternative to fossil fuel despite a less than positive track record on performance. The Narendra Modi government informed the Lok Sabha that nuclear power generation grew from 4780 MW in 2014 to 8180 MW in 2024. These figures, of their own accord, do not amount to much. The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) has a record of announcing ambitious targets and missing them by a wide mark. Cost overruns and delays in the building of nuclear reactors have been par for the course. Nuclear power’s share in total electricity generation has typically accounted for less than 3 per cent.”The Kudankulam nuclear power plant, built with Russian assistance, is a classic example of cost escalation. From an initial approved completing cost of Rs.13,171 crore for Units 1 and 2, the final cost was well over Rs 17,000 crore. The costs for construction and commissioning for the remaining Units 3, 4, 5 and 6, too, overshot estimated costs.
Additionally, nuclear power reactors require significant capital investment and are prone to chronic cost escalation. The Kudankulam nuclear power plant, built with Russian assistance, is a classic example of cost escalation. From an initial approved completion cost of Rs.13,171 crore for Units 1 and 2, the final cost was well over Rs.17,000 crore. The costs for construction and commissioning for the remaining Units 3, 4, 5 and 6, too, overshot estimated costs.
Renewable energy has stolen a march over nuclear energy both in terms of contribution to electricity and economic viability. According to the World Nuclear Industry Report 2024, solar power capacity grew by 85 per cent in between 2020 and 2023. In fact, in 2023, India overtook Japan to become the third largest generator of solar power. Wind energy production in the country grew by approximately 17 per cent from 2022 to 2023.By contrast, the growth of nuclear energy has been very slow. “It took the industry 20 years to just over double its installed capacity from 2.5 GW in 2000 to 5.7 GW by 2020,” WNIS 2024 states.
Undeterred by past records, India plans to add 18 new nuclear reactors by 2031–2032 and increase its total nuclear capacity from 8180 MW to 22480 MW by 2031–32, aiming at a tripling of nuclear power capacity by 2031–32. These targets are unlikely to be met.India’s nuclear energy programme is based on three stages, utilising its abundant thorium and relatively more modest uranium reserves. The first stage involves the use of pressurised heavy water reactors, the second involves the prototype fast breeder reactor (PFBR), while the third stage involves thorium-based reactors. Work on the second stage, involving the PFBR, began in 2004, with 2010 being the initial year of expected commissioning.
Beset by inordinate delays and escalating costs, it was only in March 2024 that the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board permitted the loading of fuel into the reactor core, an important step towards the reactor achieving criticality.And even then, as the analyst Ashley Tellis writes: “The Stage 2 breeders—of which only one intended for commercial operation, the PFBR, has been constructed—are still far from technical, let alone economic, maturity.
SMRs are increasingly being promoted as a cheaper alternative since they are more compact, supposed to take less time to construct, and have lower carbon emissions. However, the SMR concept is yet to take off despite the hype. Questions about delays, costs, and safety are being asked about SMRs all over the world.
Last, but not least, there has also been a long history of stiff public resistance to nuclear reactors, primarily driven by fears of contamination of the environment, health concerns, and the loss of livelihoods. Among the prominent protests are those at Kudankulam, Tamil Nadu, and Jaitapur, Maharashtra, but then again the government has always chosen to ignore or forget this history of public opposition.
Although Nuclear is Not the Solution does not focus on South Asia, its broader arguments about nuclear power and climate change span wide geographies. This timely book can set the stage for a fresh debate and reinvigorated discussions on nuclear energy and all that is at stake.
Urvashi Sarkar is a freelance journalist in Mumbai, India. She has reported on various issues, ranging from foreign policy and think tanks, to climate change, refugee issues, education, nuclear policy and the United Nations.