Leaked Russian military files reveal criteria for nuclear strike

Additional reporting by Joe Leahy in Beijing

Doctrine for tactical nuclear weapons outlined in training scenarios

for an invasion by China

 An exercise map from the FT cache of classified documents, along with

Vladimir Putin and an Iskander missile launcher © FT montage/

Leaked Russian military files reveal criteria for nuclear strike on x

(opens in a new window) Leaked Russian military files reveal criteria

for nuclear strike on facebook (opens in a new window) Leaked Russian

military files reveal criteria for nuclear strike on linkedin (opens

in a new window) Save current progress 0% Max Seddon and Chris Cook in

London 3 HOURS AGO 166 Print this page Unlock the Editor’s Digest for

free Roula Khalaf, Editor of the FT, selects her favourite stories in

this weekly newsletter.

 Vladimir Putin’s forces have rehearsed using tactical nuclear weapons

at an early stage of conflict with a major world power, according to

leaked Russian military files that include training scenarios for an

invasion by China.

 The classified papers, seen by the Financial Times, describe a

threshold for using tactical nuclear weapons that is lower than Russia

has ever publicly admitted, according to experts who reviewed and

verified the documents.

 The cache consists of 29 secret Russian military files drawn up

between 2008 and 2014, including scenarios for war-gaming and

presentations for naval officers, which discuss operating principles

for the use of nuclear weapons.

 Criteria for a potential nuclear response range from an enemy

incursion on Russian territory to more specific triggers, such as the

destruction of 20 per cent of Russia’s strategic ballistic missile

submarines.

 “This is the first time that we have seen documents like this

reported in the public domain,” said Alexander Gabuev, director of the

Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin. “They show that the

operational threshold for using nuclear weapons is pretty low if the

desired result can’t be achieved through conventional means.”

 Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons, which can be delivered by land or

sea-launched missiles or from aircraft, are designed for limited

battlefield use in Europe and Asia, as opposed to the larger

“strategic” weapons intended to target the US. Modern tactical

warheads can still release significantly more energy than the weapons

dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima in 1945.

 Although the files date back 10 years and more, experts claim they

remain relevant to current Russian military doctrine. The documents

were shown to the FT by western sources.

 The defensive plans expose deeply held suspicions of China among

Moscow’s security elite even as Putin began forging an alliance with

Beijing, which as early as 2001 included a nuclear no-first-strike

agreement. In the years since, Russia and China have deepened their

partnership, particularly since Xi Jinping took power in Beijing in

2012. The war in Ukraine has cemented Russia’s status as a junior

partner in their relationship, with China throwing Moscow a vital

economic lifeline to help stave off western sanctions.

 Yet even as the countries became closer, the training materials show

Russia’s eastern military district was rehearsing multiple scenarios

depicting a Chinese invasion.

 The exercises offer a rare insight into how Russia views its nuclear

arsenal as a cornerstone of its defence policy — and how it trains

forces to be able to carry out a nuclear first strike in some

battlefield conditions.

One exercise outlining a hypothetical attack by China notes that

Russia, dubbed the “Northern Federation” for the purpose of the war

game, could respond with a tactical nuclear strike in order to stop

“the South” from advancing with a second wave of invading forces.

 “The order has been given by the commander-in-chief?.?.?.?to use

nuclear weapons?.?.?.?in the event the enemy deploys second-echelon

units and the South threatens to attack further in the direction of

the main strike,” the document said.

 China’s foreign ministry denied there were any grounds for suspicion

of Moscow. “The Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and

Cooperation between China and Russia has legally established the

concept of eternal friendship and non-enmity between the two

countries,” a spokesperson said. “The ‘threat theory’ has no market in

China and Russia.”

 The Kremlin did not respond to a request for comment.

 A separate training presentation for naval officers, unrelated to the

China war games, outlines broader criteria for a potential nuclear

strike, including an enemy landing on Russian territory, the defeat of

units responsible for securing border areas, or an imminent enemy

attack using conventional weapons.

 The slides summarise the threshold as a combination of factors where

losses suffered by Russian forces “would irrevocably lead to their

failure to stop major enemy aggression”, a “critical situation for the

state security of Russia”.

 Other potential conditions include the destruction of 20 per cent of

Russia’s strategic ballistic missile submarines, 30 per cent of its

nuclear-powered attack submarines, three or more cruisers, three

airfields, or a simultaneous hit on main and reserve coastal command

centres.

 Russia’s military is also expected to be able to use tactical nuclear

weapons for a broad array of goals, including “containing states from

using aggression […] or escalating military conflicts”, “stopping

aggression”, preventing Russian forces from losing battles or

territory, and making Russia’s navy “more effective”.

 Putin said last June that he felt “negatively” about using tactical

nuclear strikes, but then boasted that Russia had a larger

non-strategic arsenal than Nato countries. “Screw them, you know, as

people say,” Putin said. The US has estimated Russia has at least

2,000 such weapons.

 Putin said last year that Russian nuclear doctrine allowed two

possible thresholds for using nuclear weapons: retaliation against a

first nuclear strike by an enemy, and if “the very existence of Russia

as a state comes under threat even if conventional weapons are used”.

 But Putin himself added that neither criteria was likely to be met,

and dismissed public calls from hardliners to lower the threshold.

 The materials are aimed at training Russian units for situations in

which the country might want the ability to use nuclear weapons, said

Jack Watling, a senior research fellow for land warfare at the Royal

United Services Institute, rather than setting out a rulebook for

their use.

 “At this level, the requirement is for units to maintain — over the

course of a conflict — the credible option for policymakers to employ

nuclear weapons,” Watling added. “This would be a political decision.”

 While Moscow has drawn close to Beijing since the war games and moved

forces from the east to Ukraine, it has continued to build up its

eastern defences. “Russia is continuing to reinforce and exercise its

nuclear-capable missiles in the Far East near its border with China,”

said William Alberque, director of strategy, technology and arms

control at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. “A lot

of these systems only have the range to strike China.”

 Russia was still behaving in accordance with the “theory of use” of

nuclear weapons set out in the documents, Alberque said. “We have not

seen a fundamental rethink,” he said, adding that Russia is probably

concerned that China may seek to take advantage of Moscow being

distracted “to push the Russians out of Central Asia”.

 The documents reflect patterns seen in exercises the Russian military

held regularly before and since Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Alberque, who previously worked for Nato and the US defence department

on arms control, pointed to examples of Russian exercises held in June

and November last year using nuclear-capable Iskander missiles in two

regions bordering China.

 While Russia’s president has the sole authority to launch a first

nuclear strike, the low threshold for tactical nuclear use set out in

the documents conforms with a doctrine some western observers refer to

as “escalating to de-escalate”.

 Under this strategy a tactical weapon could be used to try to prevent

Russia from becoming embroiled in a sprawling war, particularly one in

which the US might intervene. Using what it calls “fear inducement”,

Moscow would seek to end the conflict on its own terms by shocking the

country’s adversary with the early use of a small nuclear weapon — or

securing a settlement through the threat to do so.

 “They talk about ‘soberising’ their adversaries — knocking them out

of the drunkenness of their early victories by introducing nuclear

weapons,” said Alberque. “The best way that they think they can do

that is to use what they call a lower ‘dosage’ of nuclear weapons at a

much lower level of combat to prevent escalation.” Recommended News

in-depth War in Ukraine Visual analysis: Ukraine’s war of survival

enters third year

 Ukrainian officials argued that Putin’s nuclear threats convinced US

and other allies not to arm Kyiv more decisively early in the

conflict, when advanced Nato weaponry could have turned the tide in

Ukraine’s favour.

 Alberque said Russia would probably have a higher threshold for using

tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine, which does not have its own

nuclear capability or the ability to launch a ground invasion on the

same scale, than against China or the US. Russian leaders believe

that, whereas a nuclear strike against China or the US could be

“soberising”, a nuclear strike on Ukraine would be likely to escalate

the conflict and lead to direct intervention by the US or UK, Alberque

said. “That is absolutely the last thing Putin wants.”

https://www.ft.com/content/f18e6e1f-5c3d-4554-aee5-50a730b306b7