‘Disarmament and Non-Proliferation’

The control of nuclear weapons so far It is almost 65 years since the development of the first nuclear bomb, and yet we have had only two cases of use of nuclear weapons in war, namely Hiroshima and Nagasaki. So we have been spared the horror of a large nuclear war during this period of time during when more than 130 000 nuclear weapons were built. This is a very unusual event in the history of mankind: so many weapons built, never to be used.  Why has this happened? First, the leadership of the two nuclear superpowers and of the smaller nuclear states behaved as rational decision makers, as far as the control of nuclear weapons and the decision not to initiate the use of such weapons were concerned. In others words, deterrence worked.  But we have to recall that the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and others lesser crises (1973 e.g.) pushed the risk of a nuclear confrontation very close to the abyss. Moreover the system of nuclear deterrence worked and still works now on the basis of the capability of each nuclear superpower to react promptly if they receive information that they are undergoing a nuclear missile attack from their opponent. The idea is that each nuclear superpower should react against the opponent before its own nuclear missiles are destroyed while still on the ground (or in their silos). With this system, known as nuclear reaction alert or “launch on warning,” we have had numerous cases of false attack and hence several cases involving a high risk of accidental nuclear war. So among the factors that spared mankind the horror of a nuclear war, one has to include also good luck both in not taking wrong decisions at critical moments and in keeping technical mistakes and failures ultimately under control.We know that the probability of having a catastrophic event depends on the number of critical events: the higher the number, the higher the probability. In our case, the probability of a nuclear conflict depends clearly on the number of crises which could possibly induce a nuclear war and on the number of technical failures of the nuclear control systems. These numbers depend crucially in turn on the number of existing nuclear arsenals, the number of nuclear weapons in those arsenals, and on the number of people who have access to the nuclear button.In avoiding a nuclear catastrophe we have been helped by the fact that, contrary to the expectations of the early nuclear age, most nations have remained non-nuclear (in other words proliferation was contained).The non proliferation regime

The basic document which helped contain the spread of nuclear weapons is the NPT [Non Proliferation Treaty] of 1968, which is generally considered to be the cornerstone of nuclear stability. The NPT distinguishes its parties between Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) [States who conducted a nuclear test before 1967] and all the other states that, in order to be a member of the NPT, are classified as Non Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS). The treaty has basically three legs:

1. The Principle of Non Proliferation:  The NNWS refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons or from seeking the control of nuclear weapons, while the NWS agree not transfer nuclear weapons or parts of them to others.  Moreover, all Parties to the Treaty should refrain from  transferring [un-safeguarded] fissile material to NNWS
2. The Principle of Disarmament:  Parties to the Treaty, and particularly the NWS, commit themselves to negotiations in good faith aimed at achieving at an early stage nuclear disarmament and the cessation of the nuclear arms race
3. The Principle of Access to Peaceful Nuclear Technology.  All Parties to the Treaty have the right to develop and be assisted in the development of nuclear energy for civilian purposes

The Cold War ended with a significant effort in the direction of nuclear disarmament. Between the second half of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, the US and Russia dramatically reduced the size of their arsenals.  Moreover, for some time around the end of the Cold War no non-nuclear state decided to acquire nuclear weapons, leaving the set of countries possessing nuclear weapons unchanged, namely the permanent five members of the U.N. Security Council and –unofficially – Israel.  The Chernobyl accident in 1986 induced a negative picture of nuclear civilian activity, and for some time interest in this type of energy dropped worldwide, as did interest in proliferation problems associated with the nuclear fuel cycle and the spread of nuclear energy technology.  The NPT itself was extended indefinitely in 1995, contributing to what seemed to be a bright prospect for nuclear non proliferation and disarmament. .

Managing disarmament and non proliferation in the last two decades In the mid-1990s, the condition of the three legs of the NPT began a significant shift.  First, Russia and the US basically froze their disarmament agenda, with the last signed treaty leaving some 1700-2200 deployed strategic weapons per side and an unspecified number of tactical, as well as other retired—but not destroyed—nuclear weapons per side.  Moreover, the other (smaller) nuclear powers, France, the UK and China, stayed very clear of the complete nuclear disarmament threshold. The total number of functioning nuclear weapons stayed and still is in the range of 25 000.  In 1998, two new declared (but unofficial from the standpoint of the NPT) nuclear powers arose, namely India and Pakistan.  And later, for the first time, one country exited the NPT and made a nuclear test (North Korea).Moreover, some remarkable initiatives—such as the establishment of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) prohibiting nuclear tests and hence hindering the development of new types of nuclear weapons—basically failed to become a reality, thus contributing to the feeling that the era of nuclear disarmament was over.  Some other important initiatives (the so called 13 steps[1]) aimed at reinvigorating nuclear disarmament were discussed and approved at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, but were not even mentioned in the 2005 Review Conference, which ended without any final document.  Finally, an interest in civilian nuclear energy returned in various parts of the world.  Questions about the possibility of an effective control to prevent covert utilization for military purposes of the civilian technology became more and more relevant; the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna elaborated stricter constraints to be applied to countries developing civilian nuclear programs, notably the so-called additional protocol[2]. These stricter constraints have been received with mixed responses.  Many critical countries (i.e., critical from the viewpoint of proliferation risks) declined to sign the additional protocol.  A specific country (Iran) has been under extensive scrutiny and has been accused of developing an indigenous fuel cycle with the undeclared purpose of taking steps forward in the direction of building nuclear weapons.

In article 6 of the NPT, explicit mention is made not only to nuclear disarmament as a final goal, but also to the pursuing of negotiation leading to an early cessation of the arms race [among nuclear powers], as an intermediate step. Contrary to this we have seen in the past two decades worrisome signs of the unraveling of the arms control regime as we know it. The cessation of the ABM Treaty, the threat, by the Russian side, of the withdrawal from the INF (Intermediate Nuclear Forces) Treaty as a response both to the new proposed deployments of missile defense systems in Europe and to the increased intermediate range missile capabilities in many Asian countries, all present a gloomy picture of the status of the arms control regime.It is thus clear why the NPT increasingly has been considered to be in critical condition.

No country supports nuclear proliferation. No government is buying the argument that “more is better” when speaking about nuclear weapon states, but individual countries may decide that they need to possess nuclear weapons.

• Moreover countries differ in the strategy for enforcing non proliferation, and in their individual perceptions of the threat posed by different cases of proliferation.

Countries may decide that they want to acquire nuclear weapons for two basic reasons:

1. The presence of an external threat, especially, but not exclusively, when the external threat is represented by nuclear weapon states (whether official or de facto).
2. The prestige and the power which is associated with nuclear weapons.

The NPT up to now has done a remarkably good job in inducing countries to refrain from the acquisition of nuclear weapons by addressing, albeit in an imperfect way, both of the motivations above.  The principle of non-proliferation in the NPT helps in creating an environment partially free from nuclear threats, while the principle of disarmament aims at decreasing both the relevance of nuclear weapons and the prestige associated with their possession.  The NPT, as is well known, discriminates between haves and have-nots. This discrimination was meant to be temporary, as it was always understood that the only way to move towards a stable equilibrium is to resolve the distinction between haves and have-nots by eliminating nuclear weapons, namely by making them illegal (as in the case of chemical and biological weapons).  Progressing towards such stability is tantamount to having a manifest, unequivocal and sustained progress in nuclear disarmament.This lack of disarmament initiatives is not the only way in which the non proliferation regime has been endangered by the nuclear weapon states. One of the most significant problems facing the NPT is that some nuclear weapons states, most notably the United States, as well as come other countries, have developed a strategy wherein they have sidetracked the NPT, while paying formal tribute to its role.  Their fight against nuclear proliferation took then a more unilateral approach and included the following points:

1. Nuclear proliferation has been seen as a threat to the present system of international relations, but serious differences have been considered depending on who is in fact acquiring or attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. There were very bad (hostile) nuclear proliferators and others who were considered not so bad.  The relatively good ones (like Israel and India) of course have been treated very differently from the so-called bad ones.
2. Progress in nuclear disarmament has been not deemed to have de facto an influence on the decision of another country to acquire or not to acquire nuclear weapons.   Token reference has been made to previous achievements in nuclear disarmament, but with little or no consequence on the political decisions that are to be taken.
3. The fight against non proliferation has been primarily based on containment and repression of those countries that have been deemed to be both hostile and possible nuclear proliferators. Instruments of repression ranged from different types of sanctions to actual (preventive) war.
4. The need to control fissile material and to prevent unauthorized use by potential proliferators or non-national groups (terrorists) have been acknowledged in principle, although questions arose as to their actual position on the priority list to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

Let us elaborate more on the trend described above and on its consequences. One should not underestimate the degree of resentment that has been induced by this (real or perceived) unfair treatment, and the ensuing political consequences.  Israel was never subjected to any pressure to renounce its possession of nuclear weapons.  India and Pakistan were subjected to sanctions which were later removed, while India in the end got the best deal—the so called US India nuclear deal.  North Korea, which withdrew from the NPT, is under severe sanctions.  While we do not want to deny here that there may be serious motivations and reasonable considerations behind these unequal treatments, the overall impression is nonetheless that nuclear proliferation lost its character of being a shared ideal (or value) of the international community and instead  became one of the many instruments of some partisan foreign policy.  We should recall that the NPT itself was not meant to involve only countries with common foreign policy goals, but was instead an agreement among countries with different if not antagonistic views of the world, which agreed to some common constraints in the area of nuclear weapons.While it is true that there is no immediate correlation between the major nuclear powers’ pace of nuclear disarmament and the development of nuclear ambitions among non nuclear states, it is also true that if a general trend supporting nuclear disarmament is in place, then the global environment is less threatening to potential proliferators, and it is more difficult for countries to become nuclear without losing credibility and influence.  And while the lack of disarmament may not be the immediate motivating factor for proliferation, it has nevertheless a general overall influence on allowing proliferation to develop.  In other words, if nuclear powers keep telling others to “do as I say and not as I do”, there is no guarantee that this message will be listened to indefinitely.

Creating an environment where some specific more powerful countries impose independent, autonomous non proliferation constraints might even be considered necessary in order to effectively limit the transfer of dangerous nuclear technology and materials.  One might thus appreciate a complementary role between individual countries and international institutions in the battle against proliferation (see the so called PSI or the 1540 UNSC resolution).  Problems arise when the non proliferation campaign is used as an excuse to impose sanctions or wage war against a country that is defined as evil, and where the main aim is not to stop proliferation, but to induce a regime change.  The problems become bigger if the intervention results not in the restoration of peace and order (not to mention democracy), but in the creation of a grave situation of unrest and civil war.  Even if we have no time to address the complexity of the problems related to the last Iraq war, we want to point out that,from the point of view of nuclear proliferation, the Iraqi war had the effect of greatly diminishing the significance of the non proliferation issue, reducing it to a mere excuse for some other goal.  Moreover, the war on Iraq sent two other sets of messages: first, that big powers can bypass international institutions such as the UN; and second, that countries much closer to reaching military nuclear capability (such as the DPRK) are punished far less than countries which are classified as “evil”  yet are very far from that capability. This attitude creates an objective incentive for nuclear proliferation.The present prospect for managing non proliferation and disarmament

Beginning in 2008 and, later on with the climate created by the new US administration, a different approach to disarmament and non proliferation has begun to appear. A group of four famous former American high level officials published in January 2008 a well known article in the Wall Street Journal [3]  followed by groups of politicians in some European countries[4]. The general message of these political leaders has been a renewed call for nuclear disarmament. Later President Barack Obama said I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons and he also restated clearly the goal of the NPT: Countries with nuclear weapons will move towards disarmament, countries without nuclear weapons will not acquire them, and all countries can access peaceful nuclear energy.[5]. At present there is a clear interest in the US administration to restart dialogue with Russia over the renewal or replacement of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and making further progress in arms control and disarmament.In 2010 there will be the NPT Review Conference. Expectations are very high with respect to this Conference. Either we will have a very clear message that the three basic legs of the NPT should be rigorously respected, that disarmament should not be disconnected from the enforcement of non-proliferation, and that assistance in the development of nuclear energy should be given without undue restrictions or discriminations, but within a framework of serious and effective monitoring and control of nuclear activities or the non-proliferation regime itself will be in serious trouble. The entire international community and particularly the most powerful countries (such as the G8) should take steps in order to preserve the essence of the Non Proliferation Treaty, and to make it more effective and stable along the lines that have been highlighted by President Obama in his Prague speech. What follows below are a list of problems that should or could be addressed and a list of steps that should be undertaken by the entire international community thinking ahead to the NPT 2010 Review Conference. Obviously responsibilities of the various states vary according to their involvement with nuclear programs (military or civilian). For instance the arms reductions of US and Russia concern those two states and no one else. Still it is important that the concrete actions aimed at developing disarmament and at curbing non proliferation be included in a framework strengthening all the obligations that are at the basis of the NPT. All countries could and should contribute to this framework.

• Nuclear weapon states should reduce their nuclear arsenals to the “minimum” possible level. This line of thinking has been already made clear by Presidents Obama and Medvedev. Some of the concrete decisions in this area will be clear when a replacement of the Start treaty will be discussed. Together with the reduction of the number of nuclear weapons, there is the problem of the reduction of the role or of the salience of nuclear weapons in military planning. The key phrase used here is to deemphasize the role ofnuclear weapons in military planning. Also nuclear weapons should be takent off alert: no nuclear weapon should be launched within minutes from the notification of a missile attack. Avoiding a nuclear war by mistake is a task as important as ever.

• The development of system for Ballistic Missile Defense should be carefully considered. If the effectiveness of such systems is, as it appears to be, strongly doubtful, then countries should be very careful with the political and strategic implications of the deployment of such systems. It is not worth jeopardizing the reduction of nuclear weapons and the preservation of past arms  control agreements, by deploying defensive systems of very dubious effectiveness.
• Tactical nuclear weapons should be clearly included in the list of nuclear weapons to be considered for reductions and/or elimination.
• Eliminated weapons should be destroyed or dismantled. They should not be put in deposits and left ready to be used if there will be a need of increasing again the nuclear arsenals.
• The problem of nuclear weapons deployed on other countries’ territories should be carefully considered. Only American nuclear forces are currently deployed in other countries (5 European countries: Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium, Turkey).  Other official or de-facto nuclear powers might in future decide to do the same, creating possibly very dangerous situations. It is then reasonable to forbid the deployment of nuclear weapons on other countries’ territories before new dangerous situations may appear.
• NATO should deemphasize the role of nuclear weapons in its military planning and strategy.
• The entry into force of the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) is bound to the ratification process of a list of 44 specific countries (annex 2 of the treaty). The entry into force of the treaty will give a powerful signal to the international community that no further modernization of nuclear weapons will be possible. The annex-2 countries that should sign and ratify the treaty are India, Pakistan and DPRK. The annex-2 countries that should ratify the treaty are: China Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, US. The new US administration is clearly supporting the ratification of the CTBT but may have problems in its relation with the Senate as the ratification process requires a qualified majority of the US Senate. The international community should encourage the missing annex-2 countries to sign and ratify the treaty. As for the nuclear weapons states, the technical activities to ensure the reliability of the weapons in the (decreasing) nuclear arsenals should stay clear from any interference with the CTBT. This is technically possible and the reliability problems of warheads should not be used as a motivation to postpone or sidetrack the CTBT
• Another important instrument for pushing ahead the agenda of nuclear disarmament is the FMCT (Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty) that will forbid the production of new fissile material for military purposes.
• Together with the two major nuclear States (US and Russia), there are also the so called smaller nuclear weapons States (China, UK, France). Even if the role in the global disarmament agenda of these countries is necessarily smaller than the role of the US and of Russia, it is apparent that all the five nuclear countries share a legal and political responsibility in promoting disarmament and none of them should be exempted from taking the appropriate steps in the direction of reducing their weapons and their reliance on them.
• Nuclear weapons states that are not signatories of the NPT (India, Pakistan, Israel) and the DPRK should be induced to take appropriate steps to reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons, to reduce the number of their weapons, to sign all the possible arms control agreements compatible with their status of non NPT members, to enforce strict control of the nuclear material, respecting all the relevant agreement with the IAEA and ultimately to join the NPT.
• Finally the creation of new NWFZ (nuclear weapon- free zones) and the extension of the old ones is an important instrument in order to prevent the introduction of nuclear weapons in specific areas. The Middle East Nuclear Weapon-free zone (or M.E. zone free of weapons of mass destruction) should be constantly pursued, despite the obvious difficulties.

The possible use of nuclear weapons for terrorist purposes has been discussed for some time. Fortunately, up to now, no possession of nuclear weapons by terrorist groups has been detected and no terrorist group has been able to manufacture a nuclear explosive device.[6] The proper strategy to address (potential) nuclear terrorism is to reduce the relevant risks by controlling all fissile materials and eliminating the excess fissile material coming from the dismantlement of weapons (i.e., blending the excess HEU and disposing and/or utilizing in MOX the excess PU).  It is also important to get the agreement of all States, irrespectively of their political orientation, in controlling any amount of fissile material produced with the strictest available safeguards.  The international community is lagging behind on both counts.  There is still a large amount of excess fissile material to be disposed of in Russia mainly (about 20 years after the INF treaty) and, as mentioned above, international consensus about new stringent measures to control nuclear activities is still relatively limited and, in any case, international control (by the IAEA) does not concern fissile material for military use. The causes for this state of affairs are manifold, from commercial problems which slowed the disposal of fissile material in the former Soviet Union, to the perception that stringent safeguards are at times an instrument of discrimination rather than an instrument aimed at protecting the security of every country.  Failing a vigorous effort—both technical and diplomatic—to control and dispose of (when needed) fissile material, the spectrum of nuclear terrorism will be with us for some time. Again one has to expect that the new Obama administration will be very sensitive to the argument of controlling nuclear material and protecting it against terrorist use, but the responsibility of this problem goes well beyond the US and is in fact a responsibility of the entire international community.The final problem we have to discuss is the problem of preventing proliferation. As we said before an effective battle against nuclear proliferation cannot be separated from a clear progress towards disarmament. The other important point to consider is that the battle against nuclear proliferation will be much more effective if the constraints required to enforce control and monitoring of nuclear activities will be seen as an impartial instrument required by the international community not as an instrument aimed at discriminating between various countries on the basis of their political or strategic orientation. As we said before, the NPT was born as an agreement between states having a very different vision of the world.  In the NPT, the “imperialistic” US cooperated with the “evil empire” (USSR) in keeping proliferation under control and, for some time, in dramatically reducing the nuclear arsenals.  Different visions of the world did not impede the NPT from working.  This should be true even now when the states antagonistic to the US are not as powerful as was the USSR, but may still in general be unlikely to yield to pressures.Fairness and non discrimination (beyond the accepted discrimination between nuclear and non nuclear States as defined by the NPT) should be the key to the safe preservation and improvement of the non proliferation regime.

In order to improve the collective security in nuclear affairs, there is an urgent need to revisit the entire system of safeguards and constraints on the production of fissile materials.  The additional protocol itself (not yet adopted by a sufficiently large number of states) is probably not enough, and more stringent international control on the production of fissile material (for civilian purposes) should be established.  New ideas along these lines have been put forward by the IAEA, in particular as far as the internationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle is concerned. More ideas are needed.  IAEA membership could easily become universal, as even countries outside the NPT are members of the IAEA.  There is moreover no objective reason why all countries which are members of the IAEA should not be induced to sign and ratify the additional protocol and other possibly more stringent measures, without exception.The IAEA itself should strengthened as this vitally important agency should be put in position to perform what looks to be an increasingly wider and demanding activity in the field of control of nuclear activities.The issue of addressing alleged violations of the non-proliferation rules came up in the past and will most likely come up again in the future. The principle should be clear: violations should be met with sanctions aimed at reversing the behavior that originated the violations. The benefit deriving from the NPT membership (in terms of civilian nuclear programs) should be revoked from violators and possibly the use of force could be considered. Problems arise when sanctions are issued unfairly, when the credibility of the “international justice” is low and when the definition of the alleged violations of the non proliferation rules become intertwined with other political or strategic controversies. Soft approaches may be better suited than hard pressures, but there is no rule in general.  Dialogue may be very difficult at times, but can go a long way, and should be the principal instrument for resolving disputes.  If even a difficult case like North Korea has been put on a totally different track through dialogue and perseverance, many other cases could presumably be solved by a persistent effort towards dialogue.  The effectiveness of sanctions depends on many factors; long-term large-scale sanctions, for example, are generally less effective, as countries tend to adjust to a prolonged sanction regime, and the resulting isolation fosters nationalistic attitudes and cuts off the political/economic leadership from the international arena.  Moreover, authoritarian regimes tend to be strengthened by isolation and, if there is a determination to build nuclear weapons or WMD, this determination can be strengthened.Military force has recently been used against countries suspected of violating the non proliferation rules.  Leaving aside for a moment the important issue of the legitimacy of these actions, the results have been altogether rather a failure.  In general terms, it may be true that some military actions slow down the construction of nuclear weapons (or WMDs) by destroying some specific infrastructure, but then what comes next?  If, after the destruction of some specific nuclear infrastructure, the country is able to restart the program, then nothing has been “gained”, except possibly some time.  And if military pressure on that country goes well beyond the destruction of nuclear plants, then the recent history of Iraq shows that the end result may be a situation of total chaos, where instability may spread and create an intractable problem.We conclude this brief note by considering a specific case, namely the case of Iran, which is under various kinds of western sanctions, some of them well before the emerging of the Iranian nuclear controversy. It is my personal belief that a soft and clever approach to the Iranian nuclear file is possible and offers the best chances of a satisfactory solution.

The Iranian nuclear file

The Iranian nuclear file represents probably one of the hottest topics of the last period. The origin of the problems goes back to the Iranian failure to report specific nuclear activities. When this was disclosed, Iran agreed to suspend its nuclear activities, signed the IAEA additional protocol (but later did not ratify it), accepted IAEA inspections and waited for a more comprehensive agreement that never came. Under the Presidency of Ahmadinejad the suspension of nuclear activities has been revoked and the international pressure to force Iran to suspend nuclear activity has been successfully presented to the Iranian public opinion as the last attempt of the bigger powers to arm-twist Iran and force Iran to be deprived of important technological developments. This nationalistic approach resonated with similar arguments developed in the last 200 years or so, when Iran faced the pressures of the United Kingdom, of Russia and lastly of the US. On the other side, facing a wide concern about the real nature of Iranian nuclear activities, the UN Security Council required a suspension of the Iranian uranium enrichment programs (before negotiations could begin). Iran on the opposite side, while claiming that its own nuclear activities were purely pacific and consistent with the obligations and the rights defined by the NPT, refused to suspend uranium enrichment.The ensuing stalemate is a very risky one, as it has the potential capability of triggering a larger crisis with military actions that can bring a severe level of destruction and instability in the region. This instability would be connected to the already unstable situation of Afghanistan and Pakistan on one side and of Iraq on the other side, not to mention all the problems of security and stability that affect the larger region ranging from Somalia to the entire Middle East. Even in the absence of any military action, a serious intensification of the sanctions against Iran could have the effects of creating an unbearable situation for the Iranian economy and could induce Iran to isolate itself more from the external world. The most unlikely result of a stronger economic pressure against Iran would be the “capitulation” of Iran (however this could be defined) and/or the change of the Iranian government.  The preferred solution of the Iranian nuclear file is naturally an agreement that would strengthen the non-proliferation regime. President Obama again gave a positive input to the situation by stating that the search for an agreement with Iran should be sought with talks without preconditions. Let us speculate briefly how such agreement could be shaped.

The starting point is that the success of any negotiation requires that each party perceives the result as a victory.  In this case, Iran primarily must be convinced that it will have the possibility of acquiring economic and political gains through better relations with the West, and the West primarily must be reassured about containing the risks of nuclear proliferation. Moreover, both parties should be interested in discussing regional issues in a constructive manner that could possibly be conducive to a stable regional security architecture.    There is a general philosophical approach of the Iranian political leadership that should be understood.  This approach deals with some “basic principles” such as “justice”, on which an agreement is possible, even if opinions can differ on conclusions and implications.  A logical conclusion of the basic principles would be the rejection of nuclear weapons (NW) as an acceptable instrument of warfare.  Any statement or agreement aimed at rejecting NWs as a legitimate instrument of warfare should be considered positive and important. The specific nuclear problem could be fruitfully addressed if some basic principles of the NPT are recalled, assumed and implemented.  The Iranians will stress mainly the principle of “no extra discrimination,” in addition to the (already discriminating) distinction between Nuclear Weapon States and Non-Nuclear Weapon States.  In particular there is nothing in the NPT that forbids uranium enrichment.  If Iran wants to enrich, the argument goes, it should be allowed to do so. On the other hand, regulating the enrichment capability on a mutually agreed basis,strengthening the international monitoring regime and implementing multinational fuel cycle units or consortiums, are all topics that could be easily discussed, and where a consensus should be possible. The ensuing framework should be reassuring enough for those who are concerned about the risks of Iranian nuclear proliferation. Moreover, the relationship between Iran and the IAEA is now a positive one (and could be made much better if the additional protocol were ratified by Iran).  There should be no obstacle to continuing the review of past Iranian nuclear activities (if continuing such a review will be needed). Of course there will be also the possibility of Iran giving up uranium enrichment and fuel fabrication inside Iran, if there will be an absolute guarantees of nuclear fuel supply. This is the preferred outcome of many in the west and economically it can also make sense. Iran though seems to be not ready, at this stage, to agree to this viewpoint. But is should be pointed out that if future talks were focussed on “enrichment in Iran yes vs enrichemnt in Iran no”, these talks will go nowhere. From the point of view of preventing proliferation what really matters is monitoring and international control.The argument that monitoring cannot prevent the possibility of secret enrichment facilities is true, but it is also a misleading argument.  Nothing can exclude the existence of secret facilities in any country, unless a full-scale military occupation of that country by foreign forces and/or the destruction of its industrial infrastructure is carried out.  If these apocalyptic options are, as they should be, out of the question for Iran, then one must accept that Iran already has an enrichment capability.  Forcing Iran to declare that it will no longer enrich will not provide an absolute guarantee against secret enrichment facilities.All the regional problems could be in principle discussed with Iran. All in all, Iran is interested in having its regional role recognized and wants to be treated as a legitimate, relevant regional player.  The West too might be interested in seeing this development implemented, provided that some guarantees are given. For a successful result, compromises should be conceived, discriminations against specific countries and political groups should be abandoned, and all parties in the region should be induced to talk to each other with the idea of building common security. It will not be easy, but steps in this direction can be made and can have an immediate impact on the ground.

Conclusions

Facing the 2010 NPT Review Conference there is the need of strengthening the three pillars of the NPT itself, which are nuclear disarmament, non proliferation and assistance to NPT members in the development of nuclear programs for civilian purposes. Nuclear disarmament should be pursued in a clear way by all nuclear weapon states and monitoring systems should be improved for all the civilian nuclear activities, without adding further discriminations with respect to those that are already present in the NPT itself. The development of nuclear energy should happen in a framework that must guarantee and strengthen security for all and foster a sense of collective responsibility.It is a clear task of the most developed countries to lead the international community towards a more cooperative and less discriminatory environment, where the danger of nuclear annihilation will be drastically reduced and ultimately brought to zero. Nuclear weapons should soon be declared illegal as much as all the other weapons of mass destruction (chemical and biological weapons) are.  This will require a nuclear weapons convention similar to the chemical and biological weapons convention. Countries should clearly and unequivocally do their best to signal that they are moving in that direction.

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